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Aggressive Enforcement of the Single Subject Rule 
 
John G. Matsusaka and Richard L. Hasen* 




 Most states require voter initiatives to embrace only a single subject, and courts have 
invalidated many initiatives for violating the single subject rule. Critics argue that the definition 
of a “subject” is infinitely malleable, and therefore, if judges attempt to enforce the single-subject 
rule aggressively, their decisions will be based on their personal views rather than neutral 
principles. We investigate this argument by studying the decisions of state appellate court judges 
in five states during the period 1997–2006. We find that judges are more likely to uphold an 
initiative against a single subject challenge if their partisan affiliations suggest they would be 
sympathetic to the policy proposed by the initiative. More important, we find that partisan 
affiliation is extremely important in states with aggressive enforcement of the single subject rule 
— the rate of upholding an initiative jumps from 42 percent to 83 percent when a judge agrees 
with the policy than when he disagrees — but not very important in states with restrained 
enforcement. The evidence suggests that it may be possible to apply the single subject rule in a 
neutral way if enforcement is approached with a deferential perspective, but with aggressive 
enforcement decisions are likely to driven by the political preferences of judges. 
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I. Introduction 
 The single subject rule, on the books in at least 14 initiative states, requires that 
initiatives embrace only one subject.1 This paper studies the decisions of state judges in 
cases in which opponents of voter initiatives raised single subject claims. Courts used the 
rule to strike down or remove initiatives from voter consideration in at least 70 cases 
during the period 1997–2006 in five initiative states applying the rule.2  
The single subject rule is particularly controversial because the definition of a 
“single subject” is unclear, and, as Dan Lowenstein has argued, it is infinitely malleable 
in theory.3 As a result, judges have a great deal of discretion in single subject cases, 
unless courts put meaningful restraints on judicial interpretation of the rule. Because of 
the discretion inherent in deciding single subject challenges, critics have argued that the 
rule is incapable of being enforced in an objective manner, and should not be used (Hasen 
2006; Campbell 2001: 163), or, as Lowenstein (1983, 2002) argues, it should be used 
only in a very restrained manner. Defenders have responded that the rule is amenable to 
objective application, and that in practice judges have not allowed their personal beliefs 
to influence their decisions.4  
 Inspired by Lowenstein’s analysis of the dangers of aggressive enforcement of the 
single-subject rule, this paper investigates single subject rulings in five key initiative 
states over a 10-year period to determine the extent to which partisan inclinations, career 
                                                 
1 The 14 states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. See Waters (2003) for more information. Downey 
(2004) and Dubois and Feeney (1998) have somewhat different counts (see Part II.A below), but these 
discrepancies are not important for purposes of this Article. Each of the authors agree that the five states 
under study here—California, Colorado, Florida, Oregon, and Washington—have a single subject rule 
applicable to voter initiatives. 
2 See Part IV below. 
3 Lowenstein (2002, 47): “The difficulty of applying the term ‘subject’ in a single subject rule . . . is that by 
its very nature, the permissible content of a ‘subject’ is infinitely and essentially malleable.” 
4 For example, Gilbert (2006, p. 810) proposes the following definition: “A bill can be said to embrace but 
one subject when all of its components command majority support due to their individual merits or 
legislative bargaining and the title gives notice of the bill’s contents.” Gilbert and Cooter (2010) propose a 
“separable preference” principle for applying the single subject rule that they argue can be applied 
neutrally. Gilbert (2009) argues that judges do in fact apply a neutral principle.  
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concerns, and other factors that should be irrelevant in deciding single-subject challenges 
play a role in judicial decisions. Our main finding is that decisions in single subject cases 
are heavily influenced by a judge’s partisan inclinations, but that the amount of partisan 
influence depends on whether the state’s judicial precedent directs judges to apply the 
single-subject rule aggressively or with restraint. Specifically, in a sample of 157 cases 
during the period 1997–2006, we find that in states with aggressive enforcement judges 
voted to uphold an initiative 83 percent of the time when it proposed a policy congruent 
with their partisan leanings but voted to uphold only 42 percent of the time when an 
initiative proposed a policy at odds with their partisan leanings. In contrast, in states with 
restrained enforcement judges upheld 88 percent of congruent cases and 81 percent of 
noncongruent cases. 
 This evidence provides strong support for Lowenstein’s argument that aggressive 
enforcement is inevitably subjective:  
 
Because “subjects” are chosen for convenience, notions of what forms a coherent 
subject in politics and legislation will depend in part on ideologies and “world- 
views.” When judges apply the single subject rule aggressively, even if they seek 
to do so in accord with their sense of what the public understanding is, they will 
inevitably be exercising their own judgments in the most general way about what 
makes good political or policy sense. That is not to say that their single subject 
rule judgments will necessarily turn on whether they personally favor the 
proposals before them. But their judgments will necessarily reflect the way they 
have chosen to subjectively organize the world. (Lowenstein 2002: 47–48) 
 
The evidence suggests that in practice the way judges subjectively organize the 
world is closely linked to their political ideologies, causing their single subject decisions 
to be strongly connected to their political views concerning the policy proposed by the 
initiative. 
 In addition to its relevance for understanding initiatives and the single subject 
rule, our study speaks to broader issues related to judicial behavior, discretion, and the 
rule of law. At the heart of the rule of law is the idea that judges make decisions based on 
Electronic copy available at: ht ps: /ssrn.co /abstract=1549824
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general rules rather than to achieve particular policy outcomes. Rule-based decisions 
create predictability in the legal system, which is conducive to enterprise, and provide a 
form of equality before the law, which is essential for justice.5 This idea is central to the 
legal model of judging, which holds that decisions should be impartial, objective, 
unrelated to a judge’s personal experiences and attitudes, and driven by legal doctrine and 
rules (Heise 2002). Unfortunately, empirical legal scholars have unearthed a great deal of 
evidence that is inconsistent with the legal model. Well known examples include Cross 
and Tiller (1998), Revesz (1997), and Sisk et al.(1998). In particular, numerous studies 
have found that partisan attitudes influence judicial decisions, mainly for federal judges, 
leading to what is sometimes called the behavioral or political model of judging (Heise 
2002). Our study contributes to this body of knowledge by showing the importance of 
partisan affiliation in the context of state decisions. In contrast to most previous research, 
which finds measurable but modest effects of partisanship, we find effects that are quite 
large in magnitude. 
 Public choice scholars have advanced another model of judging that posits 
decisions are driven by career concerns of judges. (See Posner (1993) and McNollgast 
(1995) for theoretical arguments.) For example, in the federal context, judges may tailor 
their decisions to appeal to the President in order to increase their chances of appointment 
to a higher court. The public choice model is supported by a large empirical literature 
showing that judges decide differently when they must stand for re-election compared to 
when they are independent of the voters. (For examples, see Hanssen (1999), La Porta et 
al. (2004), Klerman and Mahoney (2005), and Lim (2008).) In all of the states we study, 
judges face periodic elections. A judge who rules against a voter initiative runs the risk of 
being accused of behaving anti-democratically when he or she stands for re-election, 
                                                 
5 Hayek (1960: 208): “There is probably no single factor which has contributed more to the prosperity of 
the West than the relative certainty of the law which has prevailed here.” Page 214: “[T]he essence of the 
rule of law that the private citizen and his property should not … be means at the disposal of government. 
Where coercion is to be used only in accordance with general rules, the justification of every particular act 
of coercion must derive from such a rule. To ensure this, there must be some authority which is concerned 
only with the rules and not with any temporary aims of government.” Page 218: “Judicial forms are 
intended to insure that decisions will be made according to rules and not according to the relative 
desirability of particular ends or values.” 
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which could imperil his or her prospects of remaining in office. To assess the importance 
of career concerns, we examine if judges behave differently when they are about to face 
the voters than when their next election is many years distant, and if they behave 
differently when they are on the verge of retirement than when they have many years of 
judging ahead of them. Consistent with the idea that career concerns matter, we find 
evidence that younger judges were less likely to strike down an initiative than older 
judges who were closer to retirement. However, we fail to find statistically significant 
evidence that behavior is different when a judge is about to stand for re-election than 
when an election is many years away, which is inconsistent with the public choice model. 
In both cases, the magnitude of the career concern effects is not large. 
 These findings taken together have two implications for the question of what can 
be done to minimize the role of partisanship in judicial decisions and increase objectivity. 
In terms of external solutions, our evidence suggests that increasing judicial 
accountability or reducing judicial independence through re-elections is not likely to help. 
There is even a countervailing danger with frequent elections that judges may replace one 
form of bias (the judge’s partisan leanings) with another (catering to the majority of the 
electorate). In terms of internal solutions, some scholars have suggested that judges 
should be encouraged to become more self-aware or self-conscious of the influence of 
political attitudes on their decisions. (For example, Sisk (2000: 211).) That seems a 
worthwhile aspiration, but may not be a realistic solution since the danger of partisan 
influence has been known for some time yet still appears in the data. Our finding that 
judicial bias is severe with aggressive enforcement but modest with restrained 
enforcement suggests a different possible approach, through the use of a decisionmaking 
principle or “canon” of interpretation that begins with deference to the initiative.6  
If courts approach the single subject rule with a restrained rather than aggressive 
approach, our evidence suggests that the role of partisan leanings will be sharply 
minimized. We believe our evidence demonstrating that the role of partisanship is 
strongly connected to the degree of aggressiveness in enforcement of a law is novel, and 
at the most general level, raises the question whether aggressive judging is likely to be 
                                                 
6 On the role of canons of constructions applicable in interpreting direct democracy legislation, see Frickey 
(1996) and Eskridge et al. (2007).    
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more prone to partisan decisionmaking than restrained judging in other contexts.7 In 
terms of the single subject rule itself, our evidence suggests that the most effective way to 
promote objectivity may be to adopt a restrained approach rather than to seek additional 
interpretive “tests” that operationalize the concept of a single subject. 
 This Article proceeds as follows. Part II gives background on the single subject 
rule in law and theory. Part III reviews the little empirical evidence that others have 
collected to this point on judicial application of the single subject rule. Part IV presents 
the evidence from our new empirical study. Part V discusses the implications of our study 
for the single subject rule. 
 
II. The Single Subject Rule in Law and Theory 
A. Law 
 At least thirteen of the twenty-two states allowing initiated statutes and eleven of 
the eighteen states allowing initiated constitutional amendments provide that no initiated 
measure presented to the voters shall contain more than a single subject. (Dubois and 
Feeney 1998; Downey 2004.) Some of these states further provide that each 
constitutional amendment put before voters be subject to a “separate vote.”8 A court 
determining that an initiated measure contains more than one subject will often remove it 
from the ballot or declare the measure void if it has already been enacted; some courts 
consider the less drastic step of severing the measure, and placing only part of it before 
voters.9  
                                                 
7 Whether aggressive enforcement leads to partisan decisionmaking in other contexts remains to be seen. 
The crux of the problem with the single subject rule is the malleability of the concept of a “subject” and it 
is the act of trying to define a subject that seems to open the door for partisanship. An aggressive approach 
that rejected almost every initiative without grappling with the notion of a “subject” could also be relatively 
immune to partisan influences. 
8 Lowenstein (2002) explores the separate vote cases in detail, and explains how some courts with 
restrained enforcement of the single subject rule have adopted aggressive enforcement of the separate vote 
requirement to achieve the same result as aggressive enforcement of the single subject rule. In this Article, 
we analyze single subject and separate vote requirements together, and we discuss both requirements 
simply as the “single subject rule.” 
9 See, e.g., Nevadans for the Prot. of Prop. Rights v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1235, 1245–46 (Nev. 2006). 
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Table 1 reports the single subject language in the five initiative states we study. 
The language is similar though not identical across states, but in every case depends on 
the meaning of the term “subject.” The term “subject” is not self-defining, and therefore 
courts must specify the appropriate standard for counting the number of subjects in an 
initiative. As Dan Lowenstein pithily put it, 
  
[S]uppose I am giving a lecture and I announce at the outset that my subject will 
be the battle of Antietam, the contributions made to health by vitamin C, and 
Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice. You would undoubtedly find it a 
surprising subject, but you could not say in advance that it is not a subject….[N]o 
combination of matters can be ruled out in advance as a single subject. Defining a 
subject is purely and essentially a matter of convenience. (Lowenstein 2002: 47.) 
 
Single-subject litigation during the 2006 election season shows the potential for 
arbitrary outcomes when courts apply a single subject rule. Consider two proposed 
initiatives and ask yourself if either, or both, violate the single-subject rule:  
Initiative A shifts responsibility for drawing state legislative and congressional 
districts from the state legislature to a redistricting commission. The commission must 
draw single-member districts, changing current practice which allows multi-member 
districts for the state legislature. 
Initiative B limits marriage to one man and one woman. It also prevents localities 
from adopting “civil unions” for non-married couples that would give those in such 
unions any of the rights of married couples. 
In two opinions issued on the same day in March 2006, the Florida Supreme 
Court struck down Initiative A and upheld Initiative B against single-subject challenges.10 
As to the redistricting measure, the court ruled that federal redistricting and state 
redistricting are separate subjects, and both differ from the use of single-member 
                                                 
10 Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. Re: Indep. Nonpartisan Comm’n To Apportion Legislative and 
Cong. Dists. Which Replaces Apportionment by Legislature, 926 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 2006) [hereinafter 
Redistricting Case]; Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. Re: Fla. Marriage Prot. Amendment, 926 So.2d 
1229 (Fla. 2006). 
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districts.11 As to the marriage proposal, the court held that both parts of the measure dealt 
with the subject of marriage.12 
It is not hard to imagine other courts reaching different conclusions. Indeed, some 
have. A California court upheld an election reform measure much more disparate than the 
Florida redistricting measure against a single-subject challenge.13 A state court in Georgia 
struck down a measure very similar to Initiative B on grounds that same-sex marriage and 
civil unions are separate subjects14 (a decision later reversed by the Georgia Supreme 
Court).15 
In his 1983 article, Lowenstein traced the history of California’s single subject 
rule applicable to initiatives.16 He noted the two main approaches to single-subject 
adjudication in the state, a liberal or restrained interpretation (under which most single 
subject challenges to initiatives should be rejected) requiring that the different provisions 
of the initiative be “reasonably germane” to one another to be upheld, and a more 
stringent or aggressive interpretation (under which more single subject challenges to 
initiatives would succeed) requiring that the different provisions of the initiative be 
“functionally related” to one another. California has opted for the “reasonably germane” 
test, and California’s courts traditionally have rejected most single subject challenges. In 
2002, Lowenstein wrote a second article on the single subject rule, lamenting what he 
saw as newly-aggressive enforcement of the rule in many states, including in California.  
Each state has developed its own single-subject jurisprudence and linguistic 
glosses on the rule, and it is not our purpose here to provide a detailed exegesis of these 
states’ glosses.17 Florida, for example, has earned a reputation as a state with aggressive 
                                                 
11 See Redistricting Case, 926 So.2d at 1225–26. 
12  Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. Re: Fla. Marriage Prot. Amendment, 926 So.2d 1229 (Fla. 
2006). 
13 Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Superior Court, 599 P.2d 46, 47–48 (Cal. 1979). 
14 O’Kelley v. Perdue, No. 2004CV93494, 2006 WL 1350171 (Ga. Super. Ct. May 16, 2006), rev’d, 632 
S.E.2d 110 (Ga. 2006). 
15 Perdue v. O’Kelley, 632 S.E.2d 110, 113 (Ga. 2006). 
16 A similar rule applies to legislation passed by the state legislature as well, but that is not within the scope 
of Lowenstein’s subject, or ours. 
17 For detailed analysis, see Lowenstein, Hasen, and Tokaji (2008: 382–394). 
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enforcement of the rule (Miller 2009: 182), requiring that all parts of an initiative have a 
zen-like “logical and natural oneness of purpose”18 in order to steer clear of a single 
subject violation. The Florida Supreme Court relied on this test in striking down the 
redistricting initiative described above: “A voter who advocates apportionment by a 
redistricting commission may not necessarily agree with the change in the standards for 
drawing the legislative and congressional districts. Conversely, a voter who approves the 
change in district standards may not want to change from the legislative apportionment 
process currently in place. Thus, a voter would be forced to vote in the ‘all or nothing’ 
fashion that the single subject requirement safeguards against.”19 Because a voter would 
be required to make this choice, the Florida high court held, the measure did not have a 
“oneness of purpose,” and it therefore violated the single subject rule. 
Regardless of the verbal formulation of the test, and whether or not the test 
requires aggressive or restrained implementation, courts typically have identified two 
potential interests served by the single-subject rule: prevention of logrolling and avoiding 
voter confusion.20 It is to these interests we now turn. 
B. Theory 
 The theoretical underpinnings of the single subject rule are remarkably weak. As 
Lowenstein (1983, pt. III) observes, the two most common rationales for the single 
subject rule are (1) to prevent logrolling, and (2) to prevent voter confusion. This section 
briefly sketches the main theoretical issues, most of which have been explored at greater 
length in the existing literature, as indicated throughout.  
1. Logrolling 
 Logrolling may be undesirable if it subverts the electorate’s will. However, 
theoretically it is not necessarily the case that logrolling does subvert the electorate, and 
there are clearly situations where allowing logrolling can lead to outcomes more 
                                                 
18 Redistricting Case, at 1225. 
19 Redistricting Case, at 1226. 
20 See, e.g., Redistricting Case, at 1225 (recognizing anti-logrolling purpose); Californians for an Open 
Primary v. McPherson, 134 P.3d  299, 336 (Cal. 2006) (noting interest in avoiding voter confusion and 
stating that “Voter confusion occurs when, for example, numerous provisions are included in a single ballot 
measure, thereby making it unclear that voters actually are aware of all the provisions they are voting on.”). 
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consonant with the majority’s preferences. That logrolling can be beneficial in some 
situations has been recognized by public choice scholars at least back to Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962). Here we provide a brief recap of the argument (see also Kousser and 
McCubbins (2005) and Gilbert (2006)). 
 One concern with logrolling is that by combining two “projects,” one that is good 
and one that is bad, the voters will be forced to adopt the bad project against their 
interests (what Lowenstein (1983) calls a “rider”). To see the limits of this argument, 
consider the following hypothetical situation: 
 
 Project A Project B 
Adopted 2 -1 
Not adopted 0 0 
 
 There are two projects, A and B, where A delivers the voters a utility payoff of 2 
if adopted and zero otherwise, while B delivers a payoff of -1 if adopted and zero 
otherwise. Clearly, if voted on separately, A would pass and B would fail. 
 If the two are bundled into a single proposition, voters would receive a payoff of 1 
by approving the bundle, and zero by rejecting the bundle. The bundled measure would 
then pass. It is not clear why this is a problem. The voters are better off with the bundle 
than without it, which is why they approved it in the first place. It is true that voters 
would be better off if they had the opportunity to vote on the projects separately rather 
than as a package, but nothing guarantees this would happen if the package is not 
allowed. Indeed, when a court strikes down a measure on single subject grounds, it does 
not give voters the opportunity to vote on the separate pieces, but rather forces rejection 
of both projects, which in this case is not optimal. 
 A different configuration would be the following: 
 
 Project A Project B 
Adopted 2 -3 
Not adopted 0 0 
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Here the bad project is really bad. As before, in a separate vote, project A would 
be approved, and project B would fail. If the voters were forced to decide on a bundle of 
A and B, they would reject the bundle (preferring the default payoff of zero to the bundle 
payoff of -1). In this case, there is no need for intervention by a court because voters will 
reject the package on their own. It could be argued that voters lack the ability to discern 
the payoffs of the different elements of the package, but this argument speaks more to the 
validity of the entire direct democracy enterprise than the single subject rule. In order to 
ask voters to make policy decisions, it seems necessary to grant that they have a basic 
competence in recognizing their own interests. 
 The two preceding examples indicate that if the second option is not too bad, a 
single subject rule will prevent the voters from adopting a package that makes them better 
off than not having the package, while if the second option is very bad, the voters will 
reject the bundle on their own. At best, the single subject rule is redundant; at worst, it is 
harmful. 
 The concern is deepened once we recognize that it may be possible to approve 
some valuable projects only through a bundle (what Lowenstein (1983) calls “coalition-
building”). Consider the following situation, with three voters. 
 
 Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 
 A B A B A B 
Adopted 100 -1 -1 100 -1 -1 
Not adopted 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 In this case, voter 1 enjoys very high benefits from project A and is mildly hurt by 
project B; voter 2 enjoys very high benefits from project B and is mildly hurt by project 
A; and voter 3 is mildly hurt by both projects. If we count the welfare of each person 
equally, the socially optimal choice is to approve both projects: project A produces a net 
gain of 98 as does project B. 
  If the projects are decided separately, both will fail: voters 2 and 3 will vote 
against project A, and voters 1 and 3 will vote against project B. If the projects are 
bundled, then both will pass: voter 1 will support the package (the gain of 100 from A 
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offsets the loss of 1 from B); voter 2 will support the package (the gain of 100 from B 
offsets the loss of 1 from A); and voter 3 will vote no. Allowing the projects to be 
bundled brings about the socially optimal outcome. In this situation, enforcement of a 
single subject rule will make it impossible to achieve the optimal outcome. (As an aside, 
critics of direct democracy often celebrate the give and take of legislatures as compared 
to the one-shot nature of ballot propositions. It should be recognized that legislatures rely 
extensively on logrolls to implement their agreements. Indeed, without the ability to 
logroll it is hard to imagine how complicated legislative bargains could be struck and 
enforced.)21 
 The previous example is not intended to suggest that logrolling is always 
beneficial. To the contrary, there are also situations where a logroll can bring about a 
socially undesirable outcome, such as the following: 
 
 Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 
 A B A B A B 
Adopted 3 -1 -1 3 -10 -10 
Not adopted 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 Here the socially optimal course is to reject both measures. If they are voted on 
separately, both will fail. If they are voted on as a package, however, the package will 
pass, with voters 1 and 2 in support.  
 To be clear, the point here is not that logrolls are always beneficial but rather that 
logrolls can be good and bad. Much of the doctrine and analysis surrounding the single 
subject rule presumes that logrolls are always bad, and voters need to be protected against 
                                                 
21 Our discussion here does not consider the case where the projects are interrelated in some way, as might 
be the case with a proposal to build a new train station and a new rail line. Forcing separate votes on 
possibly connected issues could lead to poor public decisions. See the discussion in Kousser and 
McCubbins (2005, page 961), and their criticism of the single subject rule on precisely these grounds. 
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all logrolls.22 As we have seen, this view is overly simplistic, lacks theoretical 
justification, and stands a real chance of inhibiting socially desirable policy changes. 
 
2. Voter Confusion 
 Another alleged purpose of the single subject rule is to prevent voter confusion.  
(Dubois and Feeney 1998: 148.) The issue of voter competence has been a central 
concern in thinking about direct democracy for as long as the process has been around, 
and it is well recognized that voters must have access to information to make wise 
decisions (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004). Contrary to simple intuitions, empirical research 
suggests that citizens are able to vote in a sophisticated manner if they have access to 
endorsements and other “information cues” (Lupia, 1994; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). 
Be that as it may, it is difficult to see the single subject rule as a vehicle for reducing 
complexity and alleviating voter confusion. We cannot improve on Dan Lowenstein’s 
brief-yet-effective argument: 
 
The rule is ill-suited to prevent voter confusion because no matter how the 
rule is construed, it will bar some initiatives that are simple and permit others that 
are hopelessly complex. Consider, for example, an initiative containing two 
provisions: (1) change the date of the primary election from June to May; and (2) 
increase the maximum sentence for the crime of rape by one year. While most 
people would regard it as odd for these two and only these two provisions to be 
combined in one initiative, and while the measure would presumably violate the 
single-subject rule, it would also be one of the simplest and most easily 
understood initiatives ever proposed in California. On the other hand, one can 
easily imagine a proposal that would contain extensive but more or less technical 
revisions in a single, specialized area—say, school finance—that could not be 
                                                 
22 For example, Gilbert and Cooter (2010) describe the premise of the single subject rule to be: “bargaining 
in the initiative process is likely to be harmful and should be forbidden.” As we have shown, the theoretical 
argument can go either way, and we are not aware of any evidence that would justify the claim that 
logrolling in initiatives is “likely” to be harmful. 
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understood thoroughly by anyone but a handful of experts, but that would satisfy 
the single-subject rule under any plausible construction. 
It is no doubt true that, all else being equal, a measure with fewer 
provisions will be easier to understand than a measure with more provisions. All 
else is seldom equal, however, and in most cases the complexities of the 
individual provisions and of the general subject matter are likely to be far more 
significant factors in the measure's overall complexity than the mere number of 
provisions. Furthermore, the correlation between the diversity of the initiative's 
subject matter and the number of provisions is likely to be very weak. An 
outlandishly diverse measure could contain one simple provision per “‘subject,” 
whereas a unified measure could contain thousands of provisions.23 
 
We also note that we are unaware of any empirical evidence that the single 
subject rule in practice has reduced complexity or alleviated voter confusion. 
 
III.  Other Research on Judicial Application of the Single Subject Rule 
Empirical research on the single subject rule is extremely scarce. Kenneth P. 
Miller (2009: ch. 4) examined single-subject challenges to voter-approved initiatives in 
five initiative states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington) during the 
period 1904–2008 as part of a larger study of court invalidation of voter-approved 
initiatives. Miller considered only challenges to voter-approved initiatives; he did not 
consider pre-election challenges, as are routine in Colorado and sometimes used in other 
states. Miller found a total of 7 cases in which there was a single subject or separate vote 
violation (Miller 2009: 116 tbl. 4.3.) but he did not go beyond this descriptive 
information to consider the factors that motivated judges to vote to uphold or reject an 
                                                 
23 Lowenstein (1983:954–55, footnotes omitted). Given Lowenstein’s rejection of both the anti-logrolling 
and anti-voter confusion arguments, it is somewhat puzzling why he does not simply reject the single 
subject rule outright (as opposed to calling simply for its liberal interpretation). According to Lowenstein, 
the liberal test should be used because it would block only outlier initiatives that went “beyond the intended 
scope of the initiative as an instrument of governance” toward “wholesale law revisions” Id. at 964. But on 
that basis, a cleaner rule would simply target revisions directly, rather than using the clumsy device of the 
single subject rule. 
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initiative. Based on a rough survey of state use of the single subject rule in recent years, 
he concluded: “By the early 2000s the trend was clear: Courts in several initiative states 
were more strictly enforcing two technical rules, the single-subject rule and the separate-
vote requirement, as a constraint on the initiative power.” (Miller 2009: 184). 
 The most comprehensive and informative study of judicial behavior in single 
subject cases is Gilbert’s (2009) analysis of California, Colorado, Florida, and Oklahoma 
between 1980 and 2007. The key part of his analysis is statistical evidence on the factors 
that explain the decision of judges in single subject cases. Gilbert includes variables that 
are intended to capture objective legal considerations as well as attitudinal variables that 
should not be relevant for decisions. For each case, he constructs what he considers “an 
objective measure of the number of subjects” by surveying UC-Berkeley undergraduate 
and law students. The students were given two principles to define the number of subjects 
— what he calls the “categorization subject count” and “democratic process subject 
count” — and asked to count the number of subjects in the initiatives that came before 
the courts in his sample. Gilbert finds that both subject count variables are correlated with 
the voting behavior of judges, meaning that the decisions of judges are to some extent 
associated with these underlying principles, at least as interpreted by the survey 
respondents. More important for our purposes, Gilbert constructs an index of each 
judge’s “liberalness” based on the partisan makeup of the state’s legislature at the time of 
the judge’s appointment (following Brace et al. (2000)), and constructs an index of each 
initiative’s “liberalness” based on classifications by graduate students at UC-Berkeley. 
He finds that judges were more likely to uphold an initiative if the judge and the initiative 
both had a high liberalness score, or the judge and the initiative both had a low 
liberalness score, that is, if there was an affinity between the judge’s presumed 
ideological orientation and the orientation of the initiative. 
 Using a statistical technique to compare the two explanatory factors — objective 
subject count and political affinity — Gilbert concludes that (2009: 51) “law trumps 
politics.” However, the method by which he reaches this conclusion (2009: 45-47) is not 
entirely satisfying. His approach is to use his estimated logit model to generate predicted 
probabilities of a judge finding a single subject violation for different values of the 
number of subjects and political affinity, holding the other explanatory variables at their 
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mean values. He finds that a large swing in the number of subjects changes the predicted 
probability of a single subject violation more than a large swing in political affinity. 
While interesting and certainly not without value, this approach is limited in that it only 
involves predicted probabilities, not actual probabilities, and the predictions rely on the 
assumption that the estimated model accurately represents the process by which judges 
reach their decisions (that is, it assumes the model parameters are accurate).24 
 We follow Gilbert’s analysis by considering the match between the content of the 
initiative and the judge’s views, although we rely on more transparent measures. Rather 
than rely on predicted probabilities to assess the magnitude of impacts, we examine direct 
(nonparametric) estimates of the actual frequency that decisions are upheld conditional 
on political affinity. Perhaps the critical innovation of our study is to compare the impact 
of judge-initiative affinity in states with aggressive enforcement to the impact in states 
with deferential enforcement. Lowenstein’s argument was not that single subject rules 
were incapable of being enforced in a neutral way, but that neutral enforcement was 
impossible if a state adopted an aggressive posture.  
 
IV. New Evidence 
A. Description of Data and Variables 
 Our analysis is based on a sample of 157 single-subject cases decided during the 
decade 1997–2006 by the supreme and intermediate appellate courts in five major 
initiative states: California, Colorado, Florida, Oregon, and Washington. The cases were 
identified by Lexis and Westlaw searches in the state caselaw databases for cases decided 
by state appellate courts containing the words “single subject” or “separate vote.” We 
then examined the actual decisions to verify that a single subject challenge was in fact 
part of the case. For each case, we identified the participating justices and collected a 
variety of information on their personal characteristics, terms, and ideological orientation, 
as discussed below. We also collected information on the content of the initiatives that 
were under review. The key explanatory variables are discussed next: 
 
                                                 
24 Logit models also incorporate sometimes subtle interactions between the explanatory variables that can 
sharply influence marginal effects. 
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 Partisan orientation of judge. We are interested in understanding how often a 
judge’s decision in a single subject case appears to be influenced by his or her 
view of the policy merit of the initiative under review. To that end, we classify 
each judge as either a Democrat or Republican. The judges in the states we study 
must all stand for re-election at some point, but the elections are nonpartisan, so 
we rarely have a judge’s self-described political affiliation. Instead, we assign 
each judge to the party of the governor that first nominated him or her to the 
court. A few judges in the state of Washington won their seats in an open election 
rather than being appointed by a governor. For those judges, we assigned a party 
based on their past career (for example, a judge who previously held office in the 
state legislature was assigned his or her party from that period), endorsements and 
fundraising (for example, a judge who received funding primarily from 
Democratic groups was classified as a Democrat), and other miscellaneous 
information. For some judges, we were unable to discover any evidence 
suggesting a party affiliation, and they were dropped from the sample.  
 Assigning a partisan orientation to judges based on the party of the official 
appointing them has a long tradition in research on courts (Brace et al., 2000). We 
believe the transparency of this measure makes it better suited for our purposes 
than index approaches (such as the one developed by Brace et al. (2000) that 
imputes a continuous ideology score based on the relative strength of the parties 
in the judge’s state in the year he or she was appointed). Our classification system 
is imperfect — indeed, casual observation of the U.S. Supreme Court makes it 
clear that the nominating president is not a perfect predictor of a justice’s 
subsequent behavior — but to the extent that our classifications are wrong, the 
result will be to introduce noise into the estimates, biasing against finding 
evidence that a judge’s partisan affiliation matters. That is, to the extent our 
classification system is crude, it will make it more difficult to find evidence of 
political motivations in judicial decisions.  
 There is an ongoing debate about the appropriate way to measure the 
ideology of a judge (Heise 2002), but for our purposes it is not important whether 
we are measuring the “true” preferences of the judge so much as whether our 
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variable predicts voting behavior: if judges are applying the law in an objective 
way, their decisions should have no connection to the party of the official that 
appointed them. To the extent we find that our measure of partisanship matters, it 
undercuts the idea that the law is being applied objectively on the basis of neutral 
rules. 
  
 Ideological orientation of initiative. A second important variable is the 
ideological orientation of the initiative being challenged. Since we are interested 
in knowing whether a judge is likely to be favorably or unfavorably inclined 
toward the policy proposed by the initiative, we attempt to classify each initiative 
as “conservative” or “liberal/progressive”. Such classifications are inherently 
subjective, but we think our choices are not overly controversial. Table 2 shows 
how we classified the different types of initiatives so the reader can form his or 
her own opinion about the validity of our measure. Some initiatives do not fit into 
an obvious left-right box, such as open primary laws and laws affecting the 
judiciary, and we assign those initiatives to a separate  “other” category. 
Initiatives where the ideological classification seems arguable are noted with an 
asterisk in Table 2; in our empirical analysis, we estimate our model treating the 
asterisked initiatives in different ways to establish robustness. We recognize that 
this type of classification is simplistic, but again, to the extent that it incorporates 
error, it will only bias against finding any effects. As will be seen, even with our 
crude classification system, we find that partisanship explains a significant 
amount of voting behavior on single subject rulings. 
 
 Career concerns. A large literature suggests that the behavior of judges, like that 
of other public officials, responds to their career concerns (for example, Hanssen, 
1999; LaPorta et al., 2004; Klerman and Mahoney, 2005). If career concerns are 
important, we expect that judges would feel pressured by re-election 
considerations to uphold initiatives because voters strongly support the initiative 
process. Judges that strike down a popularly approved measure or remove a 
measure from the ballot without giving voters a chance to weigh in could be seen 
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as anti-democratic, and pay a price at the polls. In all five states in our sample, 
judges must stand for re-election. The terms vary, ranging from a low of 6 years 
in Washington to a high of 12 years in California, and the type of election varies 
(such as open elections where anyone can run in Washington, and pure retention 
elections where only the incumbent judge’s name is on the ballot in California). 
To test for the possibility that judges weigh the consequence of their votes on 
their career prospects, we construct two variables: the number of years until the 
judge’s next election, and the age of the judge. If judges take into account career 
concerns when making decisions, a judge will be more likely to uphold an 
initiative when there are fewer years until his or her next election and when the 
judge is farther from retirement age (Florida has a mandatory retirement of 70, 
Colorado has a mandatory retirement age of 72, and Oregon and Washington have 
a mandatory retirement age of 75, but all judges anticipate retirement at some 
point). 
 
 Number of words in initiative. One argument for the single subject rule is to 
reduce complexity of initiatives and minimize voter confusion (Dubois and 
Feeney 1998). Long initiatives are likely to be more complex, and a huge amount 
of text certainly serves as a barrier to voter understanding. For this reason, some 
reformers have argued that the number of words on an initiative should be limited, 
for example, the California Commission on Campaign Financing (1992) 
recommended a 5,000-word limit on all ballot propositions. To test if decisions 
reflected a concern with complexity, we collected data on the number of words in 
the initiative. If reducing complexity is an important factor in single subject 
rulings, we would expect judges to be more skeptical toward long initiatives than 
short initiatives. When a case reviewed more than one initiative at a time, we used 
the average number of words across the involved initiatives. There is a huge 
variation in the length of initiatives in our sample, ranging from 12 at the low end 
to almost 32,000 at the high end. The longest initiatives are clustered in 
California.  
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B. Summary Information on Judges 
 Table 3 provides summary information on judges in the sample. Overall, our data 
set contains 778 votes on single subject cases. On average, 31 percent of the sample 
judges are classified as Republicans and 69 percent are classified as Democrats. In 
contrast, 56 percent of the initiatives under review are classified as conservative in their 
policy orientation compared to 24 percent that are classified as liberal (the remaining 20 
percent do not have an obvious classification on a conservative-liberal spectrum). A 
typical case, then, consists of judges with Democratic leanings deciding on whether to 
allow a vote on an initiative that proposes a policy with a conservative bent.  
 To make this more concrete, we construct a variable called AGREE that takes on 
the value of one if the judge’s partisan affiliation agrees with the initiative, and zero 
otherwise. That is, AGREE = 1 if the judge is Republican and the initiative is 
conservative, or the judge is Democratic and the initiative is liberal/progressive. Across 
the sample, 42 percent of judges find themselves agreeing (in this sense) with the 
initiative under review, and 38 find themselves disagreeing. 
 The average age of sample judges is 56.5 years, with the youngest 41 years old 
and the oldest 87 years old. On average, a judge deciding on a single subject case faces 
election in 2.9 years, with some facing election in the year of the decision and others 
facing election 12 years in the future. 
 
C. Summary of Outcomes 
 To provide context for the results that follow, we begin by summarizing the 
outcomes of the cases in the sample. Table 4 reports the frequency with which the 
initiatives were upheld by state and level of court. Consistent with California’s reputation 
of deferential enforcement of the single subject rule, California courts upheld the 
initiative in question in 94 percent of cases during the sample period. Washington courts 
were also fairly accommodating, upholding in 91 percent of cases. Florida is usually 
considered to have strict enforcement, but its courts upheld initiatives against single 
subject challenges in 80 percent of cases. At the other end, Colorado courts upheld 
initiatives 50 percent of the time, and only 25 percent of initiatives were upheld in 
Oregon. It should be kept in mind that these approval numbers do not necessarily indicate 
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the aggressiveness of enforcement. Even though Florida’s approval rate is high, it could 
be that the courts there are so well known to enforce strictly that many initiatives never 
come to the ballot, and those that do, are carefully crafted to survive challenges. The 
numbers do suggest that there are state-specific forces at work, so our multivariate 
analysis will take that into account.25 
 Table 4 also shows that state supreme courts are much less likely to uphold an 
initiative against a single subject challenge than state intermediate appellate courts, 62 
percent versus 91 percent. Indeed, the intermediate appellate courts almost always uphold 
initiatives in the face of single subject challenges across both deferential and strict states. 
This pattern, in part, is due to the fact that most decisions in California, a state that rarely 
finds single subject violations, are made at the intermediate appellate court level, so it is 
not clear if it reflects a general deference by lower level courts, or a California effect. 
 We also explored but do not separately report the trend in approval rates over 
time. Contrary to what might be expected based on Lowenstein (2002) and Miller (2009), 
the fraction of cases upheld against single subject challenge has not fallen over time. 
Indeed, if anything, courts are more likely to uphold initiatives against single subject 
challenges in the later than earlier years of our sample.26 Again, this does not necessarily 
indicate less aggressive enforcement over time: it could be that enforcement is becoming 
stricter, leading to fewer initiatives, but those that do appear are less likely to violate the 
rule. There could also be a delay in observing effects. Key decisions of a state supreme 
court could have a significant but lagged effect at the intermediate appellate courts. 
 
D. Unanimity 
 Lowenstein (1983) argued that the single subject rule is impossible to enforce 
objectively due to the inherent subjectivity of the definition of a “subject.” One way to 
                                                 
25 The number of failed cases in states such as Colorado and Florida which allow pre-election review might 
be greater than in other states because initiative proponents sometimes submit variations of the same 
measure for approval to see which variations can survive single subject challenge. 
26 Unfortunately, this statement conceals a remarkable fact: while the percent of judges voting to approve 
was never less than 58 percent in nine of our ten sample years, it was only 8 percent in 1999. Exactly what 
happened in 1999 is a mystery that is beyond the scope of our study to answer. 
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get a rough sense of the objectivity of single subject rulings is to examine the amount of 
agreement in decisions. If it is possible to determine objectively the number of subjects, 
and judges are applying the counting rule neutrally, decisions would be unanimous or 
nearly unanimous. 
 Table 5 reports the frequency of cases in which the decision was unanimous. For 
the sample as a whole, 80 percent of cases were unanimous, indicating that judges were 
able to agree on the proper outcome in a large majority of cases. The strongest agreement 
was in California (92 percent unanimous decisions) and Washington (85 percent 
unanimous decisions), where courts apply the single subject rule with deference to the 
initiative. In Colorado (75 percent), Florida (67 percent), and Oregon (67 percent), where 
enforcement is more aggressive, unanimous decisions were less common. Nevertheless, 
even in the most aggressive states, we still see at least two-thirds of the cases being 
decided unanimously.  
 The interpretation of the evidence in Table 5 is ambiguous. A high level of 
agreement could mean that judges have found neutral principles that are broadly shared. 
On the other hand, it could be that that these decisions are determined by partisan 
considerations, and that we see so much unanimity because courts are typically composed 
entirely of members of the same party. In our sample, the justices were all of the same 
party in 43 percent of cases, and homogeneous courts were 17 percent more likely to 
reach a unanimous decision.27 The next section examines the votes of individual judges 
for more direct evidence. 
 
E. Explaining the Votes of Individual Judges 
 Our core evidence concerns the votes of individual judges. We are particularly 
interested in understanding to what extent a judge’s views on the substantive policy 
implications of the initiative under review can explain his or her vote. To be clear, we are 
not asserting that any of the justices are deliberately deciding on the single subject issue 
in order to impose their policy views. Rather, we are investigating Lowenstein’s (1983) 
                                                 
27 A regression of unanimity on a dummy variable for courts consisting entirely of members of one party 
(parameters not reported)  reveals that ideologically homogeneous courts are more likely to reach a 
unanimous decision. 
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argument that because the single subject rule cannot be applied objectively, judges will 
be forced to introduce subjective considerations into their decision making, and the set of 
beliefs and philosophies that drive their party affiliation will come into play in their 
holding on the single subject rule. A critical implication of this view, which we test, is 
whether judges appear to rely more on their substantive policy preferences when the 
single subject rule is applied strictly as opposed to loosely. 
 Table 6 reports our central results, multivariate logistic regressions that estimate 
the probability that a judge votes to uphold an initiative. Each column reports estimates 
from a separate model, in which the dependent variable can be understood as an 
increasing (nonlinear) function of the probability that a judge votes to uphold. The 
variables listed are the explanatory factors. The main entries are the coefficient estimates, 
and the standard errors are in parentheses. A positive coefficient means that an increase 
in the variable increases the likelihood of upholding, and a negative coefficient means 
that an increase in the variable reduces the likelihood of upholding.28 Asterisks indicate 
coefficients that can be distinguished from noise at conventional levels of statistical 
significance. All regressions include indicator variables for California, Colorado, Florida, 
Oregon, Washington that allow for state-specific effects on the mean probability of 
approval, but we do not report the coefficients.29 
 The regression in column (1) of Table 6 includes as explanatory factors a variable 
for the number of words in the initiative, the year, and dummy variables for the states. 
The number of words is a crude indicator that might be expected to be correlated with the 
complexity of the initiative and/or the number of subjects; the year is included to allow 
for a trend in enforcement principles over time; and the state dummies capture 
differences in the individual state single subject laws. Because there are huge differences 
between states in the number of words (the average number of words in California is 
seven times the average in Washington and more than 20 times the average in the other 
states), a variable equal to the absolute number of words would capture primarily state 
effects rather than length effects. So we use instead a dummy variable equal to one if the 
                                                 
28 Unfortunately, the actual coefficient estimates cannot be interpreted directly in terms of marginal 
changes in probabilities. 
29 Our main findings do not change in substance if the models are estimated without the state fixed effects. 
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number of words is greater than the median number of words on initiatives that are 
reviewed in that state (and takes on a value of zero otherwise). The dummy variable for 
the number of words indicates whether the initiative under consideration is longer or 
shorter than the typical initiative reviewed in that state.30  
 The coefficient on the number of words is positive and significantly different 
from zero, indicating counterintuitively that judges are more likely to vote to uphold 
longer than shorter initiatives. As will be seen in the later columns, this coefficient loses 
significance when other explanatory variables are included, so the relation is apparently 
spurious, and not much should be made of the positive coefficient. However, the 
consistent failure to find evidence that judges reject long initiatives undercuts the view 
that the single subject rule is used to protect voters from complex measures. The 
coefficient on the year is also positive and significant, indicating that judges are 
increasingly likely to vote to uphold in the later than earlier years of our sample. This 
finding is robust to inclusion of other control variables, so does not appear to be spurious. 
Apparently, there has been a gradual trend toward upholding initiatives during our 
sample period. The unreported state dummies are significant and generally similar to 
each other. 
 The regression in column (2) of Table 6 adds explanatory variables that capture 
potential political considerations. The first new variable is a dummy for cases decided at 
the supreme court level, as opposed to the state’s intermediate court of appeals. The 
negative and significant coefficient indicates that supreme court justices are less likely to 
uphold an initiative than intermediate appellate court justices, even controlling for state, 
year, number of words, and so on. A possible explanation for this pattern could be that 
lower-court judges have their eye on promotion to a higher court, and thus are less 
inclined to make decisions limiting the popular initiative process. 
 The next variable is the political affiliation of the judge, which takes on a value of 
one if the judge is a Republican and zero if the judge is a Democrat. As discussed above, 
these affiliations are based on the party of the governor who appointed the judge to the 
court, and in some cases, other information in the judge’s background. The positive 
coefficient indicates that Republican judges are more likely to vote to uphold than 
                                                 
30 We also find a significant positive coefficient when we use a variable that is simply the number of words. 
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Democratic judges. We cannot say from these estimates if Republican judges are more 
accommodating because of a greater philosophy of deference, or because they are more 
likely to agree with the substance of the initiatives, but will turn to that question shortly. 
 A third variable added to column (2) reflects the ideological orientation of the 
initiative. The variable is equal to one if the initiative has a “conservative” orientation, 
and zero otherwise. We also include a variable equal to one if the initiative impacts the 
judiciary, such as term limits for judges. The estimates indicate that judges are 
significantly less likely to vote to uphold conservative initiatives and initiatives 
concerning the judiciary (compared to the omitted categories of “liberal/progressive” and 
“other” initiatives.) The fact that conservative initiative fare less well than other 
initiatives suggests that political factors are connected with a judge’s decision on a 
particular case. 
 The regression in column (3) of Table 6 drills down into this issue by adding three 
new variables. The key variable is AGREE, which as discussed above takes on the value 
of one if the judge’s partisan orientation agrees with the content of the initiative, and zero 
otherwise. As can be seen, agreement (so measured) is strongly and positively associated 
with the likelihood of voting to uphold an initiative against a single subject challenge. 
This is fairly direct evidence that single-subject decisions are not made neutrally, 
independent of a judge’s substantive policy view of the initiative in question.  
Gilbert (2009), using somewhat different methods, reports a similar finding in a 
partially overlapping sample. He assigns each judge a numerical value for partisanship 
and assigns each initiative a numerical value for ideological orientation. He finds that the 
likelihood of voting to uphold is positively related to the similarity in scores. Our results 
reinforce Gilbert’s findings, and show that simple and fairly transparent partisan 
affiliations go a long way toward explaining voting behavior. 
 Once the agreement variable is included in the regression, the coefficient on the 
judge’s partisan affiliation falls in magnitude (from 0.35 to 0.10) and is no longer 
statistically distinguishable from zero. This suggests that Democratic and Republican 
judges do not have a fundamentally or philosophically different approach to single 
subject rulings, and that the significant coefficient in column (2) was a spurious 
correlation reflecting the fact that Republican judges were more likely to be ruling on 
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initiatives they liked while Democratic judges were more likely to be ruling on initiatives 
they disliked. The coefficient on the ideological orientation of the initiative also falls in 
magnitude and becomes statistically insignificant, but in other specifications it becomes 
significant again. 
 The regression in column (3) tests for career concerns by including two additional 
variables, the number of years until the judge’s next election and the age of the judge 
(which is negatively related to the expected number of years before retirement).31 If 
career concerns are important, we expect that a judge will be more likely to uphold as an 
election draws near, producing a negative coefficient. Similarly, as a judge grows older 
and gets closer to retirement, he or she should become less concerned with re-election 
issues; because older judges would be less likely to cater by upholding an initiative, 
approval rates should be negatively associated with age. 
 The estimates for both career concerns variables take on the predicted negative 
sign, but only the age variable is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level 
of significance. The voting behavior of judges is not reliably different when an election is 
close than when it is distant, but judges are less likely to uphold an initiative as they 
become older. Put differently, young judges are less likely to challenge the will of the 
voters by rejecting an initiative. This is not particularly strong evidence for career 
concerns. 
 The estimates in column (3) indicate that judges are more likely to uphold a case 
when they agree with the substance of the initiative, relative to a case where they disagree 
and a case where they are neutral (in the sense that the initiative does not have an obvious 
partisan orientation). Since there is some ambiguity about to interpret the cases that lack a 
partisan orientation, the regression in column (4) of Table 6 reports a regression with the 
same specification after deleting the nonpartisan initiatives. In this case, the coefficient 
on AGREE can be interpreted as the effect of agreement relative to the case of 
                                                 
31 Because very long time periods to the next election can only occur in states with long terms, there is a 
danger that “years to next election” may be capturing state-specific effects. To adjust for this possibility, 
we truncate the variable at six years, that is, if the number of years to the next election is more than six 
years, we treat it as six years. It turns out that the results do not change in a material way with or without 
this adjustment. 
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disagreement. As can be seen, the underlying picture remains the same: judges are more 
likely to uphold cases when they agree with the initiative than when they disagree with 
the initiative. 
The evidence to this point suggests that a judge’s policy preferences play a role in 
how he or she applies the single subject rule. Lowenstein’s original argument is that this 
is an inevitable consequence of attempting to apply the rule aggressively: because it is 
impossible to apply the single subject rule strictly in an objective way, judges will be 
forced to introduce other considerations into the decision, and those considerations are 
likely to be correlated with their general world view that also shapes their partisan 
affiliation. The flip side of this, Lowenstein argues, is that if judges adopt a deferential or 
restrained approach to the single subject rule, they are more likely to be able to apply it 
objectively, and are less likely to rely on their subjective intuitions to make the decision. 
 Column (5) of Table 6 tests this proposition by allowing the effect of agreement 
to be different in “aggressive” states (states that are believed to apply the single subject 
rule strictly) and “restrained” states (states that tend to give the benefit of the doubt to the 
initiative in single subject rules). Following Lowenstein (2002), Miller (2009), and 
conventional wisdom, we classify California and Washington as restrained states, and 
Colorado, Florida, and Oregon as aggressive states.32 Lowenstein’s argument suggests 
that subjective factors such as a judge’s personal views will be more important in 
aggressive than deferential states. Consistent with this idea, column (5) shows that 
whether or not a judge agrees with the initiative policy is a strong predictor of his or her 
voting behavior in aggressive states. The coefficient on agreement in a state with 
aggressive enforcement is 0.93 and statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level, 
while the coefficient on agreement in a state with restrained enforcement is 0.26 and 
statistically insignificant. In words, decisions are strongly predicted by whether judges 
agree with the content of the initiative in aggressive states, but there is no relation in 
restrained states.33  
                                                 
32 Oregon arguably could be included in either group. Because there are relatively few observations from 
Oregon, the overall pattern of the results does not depend on how Oregon is classified. 
33 It appears that a large fraction of cases in our sample are frivolous challenges to two crime initiatives 
(Prop. 21 in California and I-159 in Washington) made by criminal defendants. To be sure crime initiatives 
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 The coefficients in Table 6 are difficult to interpret except in terms of the 
direction of the effects. To give a sense of the magnitude of the effects, Table 7 reports 
the raw percentage of votes to uphold, conditional on agreement and whether the state 
has an aggressive or deferential approach. In deference states, judges upheld the initiative 
88.3 percent of the time when they agreed with it compared to 80.6 percent of the time 
when they disagreed. So we see that even in restrained states, judges are less likely to 
support an initiative they disagree with, but the effect is modest. 
 The case of states with aggressive enforcement is eye-opening. Judges upheld 
initiatives they agreed with 83.2 percent of the time in aggressive states, approximately 
the same approval rate as in deference states. However, in aggressive states, judges 
upheld initiatives they disagreed with only 42.1 percent of the time. Thus, in states with 
aggressive enforcement judges were 41.1 percent less likely to approve an initiative they 
disagreed with than an initiative they agreed with. This is a huge effect, and highlights 
the important role played by subjective considerations when courts attempt to apply the 
single subject rule strictly.  
 Table 7 also reports how judges voted on issues concerning the judiciary. In our 
sample, these initiatives mainly proposed to curtail the prerogatives of judges. In the 
aggressive states (the only states where such initiatives appeared in our sample), judges 
upheld these initiatives 54.8 percent of the time, again far below the percentage of time 
they voted to uphold initiatives they agreed with. 
 
V. Discussion 
 The single subject requirement is a technical rule that is often used to invalidate 
voter initiatives, either before they go to the ballot, or after they are approved. The rule is 
controversial, with critics claiming that it cannot be enforced in an objective, consistent 
                                                                                                                                                 
are not driving our results, we reestimated the main results after deleting all crime initiatives. The findings 
did not change in any important way. We also explored including a number of other control variables, 
many of which have been used in the literature, including gender and ethnicity of the judge, legislative 
background, and academic background. See Sisk et al. (1998) for comparison. None of these variables had 
significant explanatory power or affected the main findings. Finally, we reestimated the regression in 
column (5) after deleting initiatives that one could argue are nonpartisan (those with asterisks in Table 2), 
and found very similar results. 
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way because the definition of a “subject” is infinitely elastic. Our evidence, based on 
analysis of more than 500 judicial votes in single subject cases during the period 1997–
2006 strongly supports these criticisms. We find that in states with aggressive 
enforcement of the single subject rule, decisions are well predicted by whether or not a 
judge is likely to agree with the substance of the initiative under review based on his or 
her partisan affiliation.  
 The finding that political preferences play a role in judicial decisions is not novel 
— a sizeable literature has established that point, and Gilbert (2009) has shown that 
political preferences play a role specifically in the context of single subject rulings. The 
novelty of our paper is, first, showing that the influence of a judge’s political preferences 
grows as enforcement of the rule becomes more aggressive. This is precisely what 
Lowenstein (2002:48) argued: “Aggressive application of the single subject rule therefore 
necessarily entails a subjective, standardless veto on the part of judges of the sort that was 
rejected by the framers of the Constitution when they rejected the proposed Council of 
Revision. Only the deferential approach permits judges honestly to apply standards drawn 
from the public understanding rather than from their own subjective ways of organizing 
the world.” Our evidence provides clear support for the underlying mechanism that 
Lowenstein identified as problematic for enforcement of the single subject rule, and 
builds a normative case for a restrained or deferential approach to enforcing the rule. 
 A second novelty of our paper is the finding of a huge effect of political 
preferences on judicial decisions. While many previous studies have found a connection 
between a judge’s political inclinations and his or her decisions, in most cases those 
effects have been modest. In contrast, we find that political inclinations play a huge, 
perhaps dominant role, in single subject decisions. When enforced aggressively, judges 
uphold initiatives that agree with their political preferences 83 percent of the time, while 
upholding initiatives that disagree with their political preferences only 42 percent of the 
time. There is a sense in some of the literature on judicial behavior that political 
preferences matter, but are small enough that they can be ignored in most cases. Our 
evidence shows one context where political factors appear to be central drivers of judicial 
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decisions, and suggests they must be center stage in any appraisal of the single subject 
rule.34   
In terms of the single subject rule specifically, as noted above, our evidence 
strongly suggests that the rule has not been applied in a neutral way. Some defenders of 
the single subject rule, while acknowledging the potential dangers of decisionmaking to 
suit the policy preferences of judges, claim that the problem has not appeared in 
practice.35 Our evidence identifies a central role of political preferences in single subject 
decisions, at least in the five states and the period we study. Aggressive enforcement not 
only raises the bar, but significantly increases the role of political preferences in judging. 
One limitation of our study is that we do not include controls for legal factors that 
might drive decisions (other than the number of words), and therefore we are not running 
a race between political and legal determinants of decisions (Gilbert, 2009). While it 
would be desirable to include more explanatory variables, we believe the possibility of 
omitted legal variables does not cast significant doubt on our findings. Our conclusions 
would be spurious if there is an omitted legal variable that persuades Democratic and 
Republican judges differently, and also happens to persuade them that there is a single 
subject violation primarily in cases where they dislike the underlying initiative, and also 
is more persuasive in states with aggressive than restrained enforcement. We cannot think 
of an obvious candidate for what such an omitted variable might be. 
Another limitation of our study is the potential endogeneity of a state’s decision to 
adopt an aggressive versus strict approach to enforcement. Because we do not know what 
caused one state to adopt an aggressive stance and another to adopt a restrained stance, 
we cannot rule out the possibility that some underlying factor in the state’s political 
environment drives both the choice of aggressive enforcement and partisan judicial 
decisionmaking. If this was the case, it would not be aggressive enforcement itself that 
led to partisan decisions, but the unidentified factor. While we acknowledge this 
                                                 
34 Of course, our results hold in a particular set of states and time period; it remains to be seen whether our 
findings hold for other states and other time periods. So some caution is in order when generalizing beyond 
our sample. 
35 Gilbert (2009, p. 5): “I find that law trumps politics. Judges apply the rule more objectively that most 
observers expect, although politics does matter.” 
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possibility, the fact that there is a strong theoretical case for drawing a line of causality 
from aggressive enforcement to partisan decisions goes some way toward allaying the 
concern that our finding is entirely spurious. 
 The politicization of judging that accompanies aggressive enforcement of the 
single subject rule undermines the rule of law and leads to several potential problems. To 
the extent that decisions depend on the identity of the judges that hear a case, initiative 
sponsors will find it difficult to determine the legal validity of their proposals. The 
problem is especially acute at the intermediate appellate level where proponents face the 
possibility of their measure being challenged in any number of courts, with judges of 
widely varying partisan orientation. This form of judicial roulette acts as deterrent to the 
extent that proponents are risk averse, with the result that some proponents will choose to 
forgo the costs of an initiative campaign rather than face the uncertainty of judicial 
reversal.36 As a consequence, the electorate will end up with fewer options, and policy 
choices will be less congruent with the will of the majority.37 Lowenstein observes that a 
purpose of the single subject rule is to perfect the initiative process. Contrary to this 
purpose, subjective decisionmaking by judges will have the effect of inhibiting its use. 
Thus, politicization of the rule threatens to undermine the direct democracy process itself 
by discouraging citizen petitions. Another problem, noted by Lowenstein, is that political 
decisionmaking will be seen as arbitrary by citizens, thus undermining confidence in the 
judicial system.38 
 For the same reason, our results suggest we should be pessimistic about efforts to 
discover a legal theory that could objectively discriminate between one and multiple 
                                                 
36 See Lowenstein (1983, Section III(4)) for a discussion of the problems created for initiative proponents 
by aggressive enforcement. 
37 For theory and evidence that initiatives bring about policies more consonant with public opinion, see 
Gerber (1999), Matsusaka and McCarty (2001), and Matsusaka (2004, 2009). For surveys of recent 
research on direct democracy, see Lupia and Matsusaka (2004) and Matsusaka (2005). 
38 Hayek (1960, p. 219): “To use the trappings of judicial form where the essential conditions for a judicial 
decision are absent, or to give judges power to decide issues which cannot be decided by the application of 
rules, can have no effect but to destroy the respect for them even where they deserve it.” Lowenstein (1983) 
raises the issue of an erosion of public confidence in the judiciary with aggressive enforcement of the single 
subject rule. 
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subjects.39 Experience strongly suggests that judges so far have been unable to settle on a 
doctrine that can be enforced in a neutral and consistent manner. Instead, our evidence 
suggests that neutrality and consistency would be better advanced by adoption of a 
restrained or deferential posture. As discussed by Lowenstein and elaborated above, we 
believe the dangers that the single subject rule is purported to address are exaggerated in 
any case, and the hope of alleviating these modest dangers is unlikely to outweigh the 




                                                 
39 For recent efforts see Gilbert (2009) and Gilbert and Cooter (2010). 
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Table 1. Single Subject Rules in Specific States 
 
State Rule Source 
California “An initiative measure embracing more 
than one subject may not be submitted to 
the electors or have any effect.” 
California Constitution, 
Article II, Section 8 (d) 
   
Colorado “No measure shall be proposed by 
petition containing more than one 
subject, which shall be clearly expressed 
in its title …” 
Colorado Constitution 
Article V, Section 1 (5.5) 
 
   
Florida “…any … revision or amendment, except 
for those limiting the power of  
government to raise revenue, shall 
embrace but one subject and matter 
directly connected therewith.” 
Florida Constitution, Article 
XI, Section 3 
   
Oregon “A proposed law or amendment to the 
Constitution shall embrace one subject 
only and matters properly connected 
therewith.” 
Oregon Constitution, 
Article IV, Section 1 (2d) 
   
Washington “No bill shall embrace more than one 
subject, and that shall be expressed in the 
title.” 
Washington Constitution, 
Article II, Section 19 
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Table 2. Classification of Initiatives by Ideology 
An asterisk indicates subjects for which the classification is arguable.  
 




Campaign finance, ban on 
public funding* 
 





reduction in services 
 
Land use, limits on takings 
 
Lawsuits, limits on 
noneconomic damages & 
limits on contingency fees 
 
Nonpartisan redistricting in 
















Crime, increased rights for 
accused 
 








Gun ownership, restrictions 
 
Land use, limits on 
development 
 
Medical, limit on doctor 
fees* 
 
Minimum wage increase 
 
Nonpartisan redistricting in 



















Judicial term limits and 
discipline 
 
Medical, choice of 
providers 
 
Medical, disclosure of 
hospital performance 
 











Taxes, replace all taxes with 






Water district revenue, 
transfer to education 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics on Judges 
This table reports summary statistics where the unit of observation is a judge. AGREE is equal to one if (i) 
the judge is a Democrat and the initiative is liberal/progressive, or (ii) the judge is a Republican and the 
initiative is conservative. The sample covers the period 1997-2006 and the states of California, Colorado, 
Florida, Oregon, and Washington. 
 
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Dummy = 1 if judge votes to 
uphold 0.69 0.46 0 1 778 
Number of words in initiative 5,626 9,058 12 31,942 634 
Year of decision 2001.25 2.67 1997 2006 778 
Dummy = 1 if judge Republican 0.31 0.46 0 1 742 
Dummy = 1 if conservative 
initiative 0.56 0.50 0 1 778 
Dummy = 1 if liberal initiative 0.24 0.43 0 1 778 
AGREE: Dummy = 1 if initiative 
agrees with judge’s party 0.42 .49 0 1 742 
DISAGREE: Dummy = 1 if 
initiative disagrees with judge’s 
party 
0.38 0.49 0 1 742 
Age of judge 56.5 7.0 41 87 704 
Years to next election 2.9 2.8 0 12 764 
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Table 4. Percent of Decisions that Upheld Initiative 













Colorado 50 [32] … 
50 
[32] 
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Table 5. Percent of Unanimous Decisions 
The number of cases is reported in square brackets. Data cover the period 1997-2006. 
 









Colorado 75 [32] … 
75 
[32] 
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Table 6. Logistic Regressions Predicting Vote of Individual Judges 
Each column reports estimates from a logistic regression that predicts the probability that a judge votes to 
uphold the initiative and reject the single subject challenge. Standard errors are in parentheses beneath 
coefficient estimates. All regressions include state-specific dummy variables for California, Colorado, 
Florida, Oregon, and Washington. The estimates in columns (4) and (5) exclude observations in which the 
initiative does not have a partisan orientation. The data cover the period 1997-2006. Significance levels are 
indicated: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Words: Dummy = 1 if number of words greater 





















Dummy = 1 if supreme court (0 = intermediate 

















































AGREE: Dummy = 1 if conservative initiative 
and Republican judge, or liberal initiative 
and Democratic judge 





AGREE in “aggressive” states: Dummy = 1 if 
AGREE and state is Colorado, Florida, or 
Oregon 




AGREE in “restrained” states: Dummy =1 if 
AGREE and state is California or 
Washington 
… … … … 0.26 
(0.54) 
      
Observations 634 628 599 509 509 
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Table 7. Percent of Judges Voting to Uphold in Aggressive and Restrained States 
This table reports the percentage of judges voting to uphold, conditional on whether they “agree” or 
“disagree” with the policy of the initiative, and conditional on whether the state has an “aggressive” or 
“restrained” approach to the single subject rule. Initiatives are classified ideologically as in Table 2. The 
number of observations is in square brackets. Data cover the period 1997-2006. 
 







(CO, FL, OR) 
All states 
together 
AGREE: Democratic judge and 
progressive initiative, or 








DISAGREE: Democratic judge 
and conservative initiative, or 








Initiative pertaining to judiciary … 54.8 [42] …. 
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